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Unity in Diversity as Europe’s 
Vocation and Conflicts Law as 




“Unity in Diversity” was the fortunate motto of the otherwise unfortunate Draft 
Constitutional Treaty. The motto did not make it into the Treaty of Lisbon. It deserves to be 
kept alive in a new constitutional perspective, namely the re-conceptualisation of European 
law as new type of conflicts law. The new type of conflicts law which the paper advocates is 
not concerned with selecting the proper legal system in cases with connections to various 
jurisdictions. It is instead meant to respond to the increasing interdependence of formerly 
more autonomous legal orders and to the democracy failure of constitutional states which 
result from the external effects of their laws and legal decisions on non-nationals. European 
has many means to compensate these shortcomings. It can derive its legitimacy from that 
compensatory potential without developing federal aspirations.  
The paper illustrates this approach with the help of a topical example, namely the conflict 
between European economic freedoms and national industrial relations (collective labour) 
law. The recent jurisprudence of the ECJ in Viking, Laval, and Rüffert in which the Court 
established the supremacy of the freedoms over national labour law is criticised as a counter-
productive deepening of Europe's constitutional asymmetry and its social deficit. 
The introductory and the concluding sections generalise the perspectives of the conflicts-law 
approach. The introductory section takes issue with max Weber’s national state. The 
concluding section suggests a three-dimensional differentiation of the approach which seeks 
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Unity in Diversity as Europe’s 
Vocation and Conflicts Law as 
Europe’s Constitutional Form 
 
Introduction 
“Unity in Diversity” was the fortunate motto of the ill-fated Draft 
Constitutional Treaty.1 This motto deserves to be kept alive, despite this 
failure and even more so under the impression of the present all too rash 
claims for centralising moves outside cumbersome treaty amendment 
procedures. It seems even safe to say that the challenges that it articulates 
have become even more obvious: The Member States of the European Union 
are no longer autonomous but in many ways, inter-dependent and hence 
depend upon co-operation. And yet, this interdependence contrasts strikingly 
with an ever greater socio-economic diversity, new schisms between 
Eurozone countries and other members of the Union, conflicts between north 
and south, creditors and debtors. In view of the diversity in the histories of 
European democracies, their uneven potential and/or willingness to pursue 
objectives of distributional justice, their different memories of economic and 
financial crises, differentiating answers suggest themselves. The sustainability 
of the whole European project seems to depend upon the construction and 
institutionalisation of a “third way” between or beyond the defence of the 
nation state, on the one hand, and federalist or quasi-federalist ambitions, on 
the other.  
                                                        
1 Article I-8 Draft European Constitutional Treaty (OJ C 310/1, 16/12/2004). 





Conflicts-law constitutionalism is the third way which this essay will explore 
and defend. This is a sociologically realist and normatively ambitious 
suggestion -- and certainly one which must not be misunderstood as a sceptic 
retreat from Europe’s common project with its commitments to democracy 
and the rue of law. As a precautionary move, the first section will recall a 
classical address of Max Weber’s. It will use this reference to re-construct a 
legacy of crucial significance and topical relevance, namely the taming of 
economic nationalism. Section II will deal with the legitimacy problématique of 
this project’s original institutional design and discuss three significant 
theoretical efforts of the foundational period to cope with this challenge. 
Section III will then analyse the post-foundational dynamics of the integration 
project and argue that these developments have exhausted the analytical 
adequacy and normative validity of the all three theoretical concepts. Section 
IV will present the conflicts law approach as an alternative response to 
Europe’s legitimacy problématique. Exampla trahunt: the recent labour law 
jurisprudence of the CJEU will serve to illustrate the alternative framing of 
the conflict constellation which the Court had assess (Section V). An Epilogue 
summarise its problems and perspectives. 
 
I. Max Weber’s economic Nationalism 
Max Weber inaugural address in the University of Freiburg of 1895 was to 
become a real classic. The address was published in under the instructive title 
“The National State and Economic Policy”.2 It has regained a fascinating, 
albeit disquieting, topicality for two reasons. The first concerns the object of 
the field study which Weber used to explain some of his more abstract 
                                                        
2 Der Nationalstaat und die Volkswirtschaftspolitik, (Freiburg i.Br.: C.A. Wagner, 1895) [citations 
here are from Fowkes’ translation in (1980) 9 Economy and Society, pp. 420-449]. 
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theoretical positions and provocative political views. The field study dealt 
with the reasons for, and implications of, the migration of workers. It is of 
stunning topicality – and the analysis which Weber delivered excels in 
precision and subtlety. However, Weber also used this case to explain and 
defend a vision of the political and economic commitments of the nation state, 
which is, at best, a contrast to the European vocation. 
Weber drew upon the empirical work which he had undertaken in 1892, 
while still a Pivatdozent in Berlin, in the context of a major Enquète of the Verein 
für Socialpolitik (Association for Social Reform) on the situation of the agrarian 
work force in the German Reich. He had focused there on “the posting of 
workers” from Poland to the Prussian Province of West-Prussia. His analysis 
addressed the transformation of pre-modern of patriarchical structures into a 
capitalist agrarian economy, identified the pressures which this processes 
exerted on the landowners, described the incentive structure which fostered 
the import of “cheap labour” from the neighbouring regions of Poland and 
from the deeper East Galicia.3 The capability of the Poles to endure the poor 
working conditions and the social situation in the new agrarian economy, so 
Weber observed, was fostering the gradual increase of the Polish and the 
decrease of the German share. The great theorist of occidental rationalism felt 
deeply irritated. Weber expressed his concern about the decline of “German-
ness” (Deutschtum) in West Prussia. And, equally irritating in EU-
perspectives, he called for corrective state measures: a closure of the borders 
to migrating workers, and the purchase of land by the state. 
Even more irritating, however, is what he submits as his “subjective” position 
- the value judgements nurturing his political advice. 
                                                        
3 For See a reconstruction of Weber’s analysis in the light of ideational and societal 
transformation processes of his time see Ageval, “Science, Values, and the Empirical Argument in 
Max Weber’s Inaugural Address”, (2004) 4 Max Weber Studies, 157-177. 





“And the nation State is for us not an indefinite something that one feels 
one can place all the higher the more its essence is shrouded in mystical 
gloom, but the worldly power organisation of the nation, and in this 
nation State is raison d’état for us, the ultimate value criterion on 
economic considerations too. It does not mean to us, as a strange 
misunderstanding believes: ‘state assistance’ instead of ‘self-help’, 
national regulation of economic life instead of the free play of economic 
forces, but we want through this slogan to raise the demand that for 
questions of German national economic policy -- including the question 
whether and how far the State should interfere in economic life or 
whether and when it ought instead to set the nation’s economic forces 
free to develop themselves and tear down restraints on them -- in the 
individual case the last and decisive vote ought to go to the economic and 
political power interests of our nation, and its bearer, the German 
State.”4 
Even Weber’s audience in Freiburg was apparently upset and Weber 
distanced himself later from this strong language.5 What motivated his 
polemic? Weberian sociologist and historians underline that Weber never 
understanding of value judgments as being changeable and always carrying 
an irrigational element. Neither should Weber’s reference to be interpreted as 
an ethnic nationalism nor should his insistence on the importance of “the 
economic” be equated with that of contemporary mainstream economics.6 
What does indeed differentiate carefully and clearly between general 
methodological, economical, and political orientations which will, in his view 
unavoidably so, inform the Volkswirtschaftspolitik (economic policy-making). 
When he diagnoses the readiness of migrant workers from Poland to accept 
the hardships of their new existence in the “host state”, he is, in fact, 
describing what we would call a “race to the bottom” and questioning 
                                                        
4 The translation is not taken from the source in note 2 but was done by Iain F. Fraser, Florence. 
5 See Max Weber’s letter to his brother Alfred, cited in Aldenhoff-Hübinger, “Max Weber’s 
Inaugural Address of 1895 in the Context of the Contemporary Debates in Political Economy”, 
(2004) 4 Max Weber Studies, 143-156, at 146 note 8. 
6 Aldenhoff, (previous note).  
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precisely the “willingness to starve the most” as the underlying mechanism. 
There is a critical dimension in Weber’s position, in particular in his rejection 
of any claim to “objective validity” of arguments presented in the name of 
economic theorising; such arguments tend to camouflage normative 
judgements and political choices – a cardinal sin in the eyes of Weber’s 
epistemology. This is not to defend the substance of Weber’s 
pronouncements. We have reasons to remain irritated when reading about the 
“role played by physical and psychological racial differences between 
nationalities [sic!] in their struggle for existence”.7 And yet, Weber the 
methodology remains an important warning against spurious claims, not only 
of the historical school, but also of contemporary neo-classical economics8 - 
including their all to negligent contemporary use in misguiding 
rationalisations of the integration project as a whole and so many of its 
segments.  
 
II. The European Response to The failures of Weber’s 
Nation States and the Problématique of its Institutional 
Design 
The project of European integration can be understood as a constructive 
response to the failures of the Weberian nation state, and, more generally and 
in broader perspectives, to Europe’s bitter experiences in the twentieth 
century. After 50 years of integration, however, the response conceived by our 
founding fathers seems incomplete and insufficient. Ever since the turn to 
majority-voting in the Single European Act of 1987 we are becoming aware of 
                                                        
7 This opening statement of the inaugural address is a core reference in the debates on Weber’s 
nationalism, see, for example, Palonen, “Was Max Weber a ‘Nationalist’? A Study in the Rhetoric 
of Conceptual Change, (2001) 1 Max Weber Studies, 196-214. 
8 See Ageval, note 3, 172-74. 





tensions between the progress of integration and the Europe’s democratic 
commitments. In the aftermath of the French and the Dutch referenda of 2005, 
concerns about the Union’s neo-liberal tilt and the “social deficit”, i.e., the 
compatibility of its institutional design and the welfare traditions of European 
democracies moved to centre stage. The Irish “No” of 2008 to the Treaty of 
Lisbon was perceived as an erosion of the permissive consensus that had 
backed the progress of integration. During the present financial crisis the 
instability of Europe’s economic constitution became apparent. All of these 
unresolved issues and queries seem to suggest that we have to re-consider 
our premises. 
It would, of course, in particular under the impression of the present crisis be 
absurd to assume that conceptual re-orientations, which an academic legal 
exercise such as the one we are undertaking, could produce ready-made 
recipes to Europe’s multi-faceted problématique. However, we cannot hope to 
find proper practical responses without any conceptual guidance. In that 
sense our project is ambitious. What we suggest in nothing less than a re-
conceptualisation of the integration project of paradigmatic proportions. The 
messages of “conflicts-law constitutionalism” differ from the prevailing 
visions most markedly in two respects. As the recourse to the notion of 
conflicts law indicates, the approach assigns primacy to the resolution of 
conflicts arising out of Europe’s diversity rather than the establishment of a 
unitary legal regime. Equally important, the approach takes account of the 
ongoing contestation about the kind of polity which the integration process is 
to generate. This contestation is not different in principle from the ongoing 
domestic contests about the proper political order – with the important 
difference, however, that the law of constitutional democracies provides a 
framework which channels political contestation, while, in contrast, the law of 
the integration process cannot build upon this type of legitimating 
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framework. This is why we submit that our type of re-thinking and counter-
visions is in line and supported by the deeper structures of the European 
political and social fabric. It is also by no means as idiosyncratic as its title 
may sound. There are affinities with, e.g., Joseph Weiler’s juxtaposition of 
“Europe as unity” v. “Europe as community”,9 and Kalypso Nicolaïdes’ 
vision of a European “demoi-cracy”.10 What approaches like these have in 
common with conflicts-law constitutionalism is the effort to reflect the 
historical context of the integrations project, the readiness to acknowledge the 
limitations of its institutional design, to reflect upon the Union’s potential to 
cope with its present problems, and to search for a re-conceptualisation of 
Europe’s legal architecture within which these challenges can be addressed. 
This is, methodologically speaking, not fundamentally different from the 
exercises all schools of legal integration theory have undertaken. Our 
reconstruction on the merits and shortcomings of that legacy will have to 
proceed selectively, albeit not arbitrarily. Our analyses will depart from, and 
be restricted to, three schools of thought of long-term significance. Each of 
these three has some fundamentum in re: each can claim to conceptualise 
important elements of Europe’s integration law, and each provides normative 
reasons for its specific conceptualisation for the model of European rule 
which it defends and promotes. It is a further characteristic of our re-
construction that we take account of both the internal developments of each 
of these models and the continuous contestation among them, along with the 
ups and downs in terms of their practical impact. We will also argue, 
however, that all three have, notwithstanding their remarkable viability, 
deficits in common, which exhaust their potential to cope with the present 
challenges that Europe faces. 
                                                        
9 See Sections II.3 and III.2.3 infra. 
10 Nicolaïdis, “The new constitution as European ‘demoi-cracy’?” (2004) 7 Critical Review of 
International Social and Political Philosophy, 76-93. 





One aspect which the three models have in common can be stated negatively 
although it is not meant as a critique of their original ambitions and 
accomplishments. Legal integration theorist in so-called the foundational 
period were perfectly aware of the discrepancy between the European and the 
national level of governance, and did not conceive of the European Economic 
Community as a constitutional democracy in being. What they have in 
common is a search for legitimate governance beyond nation-state confines 
and national frames. Their messages on the modes of transnational 
governance, however, differed significantly: (1) “Europe should be 
institutionalised as a technocratic regime and be restricted to that function”. 
(2) “Europe’s vocation is the establishment of an ‘economic constitution’ 
which is to protect individual freedoms and to discipline the exercise of 
political power”; and (3) “Europe has accomplished and should preserve an 
equilibrium between a supranational legal order and ongoing political 
contestation and bargaining”.  
 
II.1 Europe as Technocratic Administration: Hans Peter Ipsen and Ernst 
Forsthoff 
Hans Peter Ipsen was the influential founding father of European Law in 
Germany. He was a very remarkable protagonist of Germany’s legal 
scholarship. He past was by no means flawless.11 “not totally flawless” (nicht 
ganz unbefleckt). His post-war work on the Basic Law of the young German 
democracy, however, documents very clearly democratic commitments in 
                                                        
11 See Stolleis, Geschichte des öffentlichen Rechts in Deutschland. 3. Band: 1914-1945 (Beck, 1999), 
336 f.; Joerges, “Europe a Großraum? Shifting Legal Conceptualisations of the Integration 
Project”, in Joerges and Ghaleigh (Eds.), Darker Legacies of Law in Europe: The Shadow of National 
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general, and to the Sozialstaatlichkeit of the new order in particular.12 He had 
started to work on European law at the age of 50 – and helped to establish 
Europarecht as a distinct legal discipline.13 Precisely his democratic 
commitments may explain both, Ipsen’s sensitivity for the precarious 
legitimacy of the European system on the one hand, and the affinities between 
his own response and the work of one of Germany’s most famous 
contemporary public law scholars, namely, Ernst Forsthoff, on the other. 
These affinities are, at first sight, somewhat surprising in view of the 
differences in their constitutional theorising;14 they are, nevertheless, plausible 
in view of Ipsen’s search for a type of rule whose validity was not dependent 
on democratic legitimacy. The communities were to confine themselves to 
administering questions of “knowledge”, but leave truly “political” questions 
to democratic and legitimated bodies.15 The characterisation of the European 
Communities as “Zweckverbände funktionaler Integration” (organisations with 
functionally-defined objectives)” was path-breaking. With this theory, Ipsen 
rejected both further-reaching federal integration notions and earlier 
interpretations of the community as a mere international organisation. He 
saw Community law as a tertium between (federal) state law and international 
law, constituted by its “objective tasks” and adequately legitimised by their 
solution.16 This theory had an implicit answer to the queries about “the social” 
on offer. Ernst Forsthoff had, in his contribution to the so-called 
Sozialstaatskontroverse, argued that the realisation of social objectives had to 
                                                        
12 Suffice it here to point to Ipsen, “Über das Grundgesetz” (1949), reprinted along with a bundle 
of his later essays in idem, Über das Grundgesetz (Tübingen: Mohr/Siebeck, 1988), pp 1-37. 
13 See his opus magnum: Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht, (Mohr/Siebeck, 1972) 
14 See Ipsen, Über das Grundgesetz (note 12) on the one hand, and Forsthoff, “Begriff und Wesen 
des sozialen Rechtsstaats”, in (1954) 12 Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung deutscher 
Staatsrechtslehrer, 8-36, on the other. 
15 Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht, (note 13), pp. 176 et seq., 1045; very remarkable, in the 
present context, is his rejection of the idea of an economic constitution at both European and 
national level (pp. 563-566). 
16 See Ipsen, Verfassungsperspektiven der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, (Walter de Gruyter, 
1970), p. 8 et seq., and the interpretation by M. Kaufmann, Europäische Integration und 
Demokratieprinzip, (Nomos, 1997), p. 300 et seq., 312 et seq. 





operate outside the rule of law; the provision of welfare was hence, by virtue 
of the very nature of social policies, characterised as an administrative task, 
which was incompatible with the commitment to the Rechtsstaat (“rule of 
law”) in the Basic Law.17 This was not a principled objection against welfare 
policies. What is, nevertheless, difficult to conceive is how the European 
Zweckverband with its transnational machinery might actively pursue the type 
of activities which welfare states administer domestically. In more principled 
terms, it seemed, at any rate, inconceivable that the type of a “hard” legal 
Sozialstaats-commitment, which Forsthoff’s opponents understood as a 
constitutive dimension of the Federal Republic’s democracy,18 would be 
institutionalised at European level. 
 
II.2 Europe's Economic Ordo: Walter Eucken and Franz Böhm 
The notion of the “social market economy” was formally introduced into 
Europe’s constitutional parlance by a joint motion of Joschka Fischer and 
Domenique Villepin in the course of the debates on the Constitutional 
Treaty.19 Their initiative was meant to calm down the anxieties over the neo-
liberal tilt in the European project. The clause on the social market economy 
seems to have has fulfilled this function quite well. However, the vague 
notion of the “social” and simultaneously “competitive” market economy of 
the Convention and the Treaty of Lisbon is situated at a great distance from 
the original and fairly precise contours of Germany’s “sozialer 
Marktwirtschaft”. As the most important protagonist of the concept, Alfred 
                                                        
17 Forsthoff, “Begriff und Wesen des sozialen Rechtstaates” (note 14). 
18 The so-called Sozialstaats-debate is an evergreen in German constitutionalism; for recent 
contributions, see Rödl, “Die Idee demokratischer und sozialer Union im Verfassungsrecht der 
EU”, in Bast and Rödl (Eds.), Wohlfahrtsstaatlichkeit und soziale Demokratie in der EU, 
Europarecht, Beiheft 1/2013. Joerges, “Rechtsstaat and Social Europe: How a Classical Tension 
Resurfaces in the European Integration Process”, (2010) 9 Comparative Sociology, 65-85. 
19 See the references in Joerges, “What is left of the European Economic Constitution? A 
Melancholic Eulogy”, (2005) 30 European Law Review, 461-489, at 486. 
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Müller-Armack, explained repeatedly and clearly, the “social market 
economy” was to provide a “third way” beyond economic liberalism, on the 
one hand, and beyond socialism, on the other. There was no conditioning of 
this model by requirements of “competitiveness”; quite to the contrary, the 
governance of market mechanisms were subjected to commands of social 
justice. 20 
Müller-Armack and his political allies were keen to underline the 
compatibility of their vision with the Ordo-liberal School of economics and 
the essential role assigned to economic freedoms and the protection of an 
undistorted system of competition by law and strong politically-independent 
enforcement authorities. The development of Ordo-liberalism as an economic 
theory and vision of a political order had started in the early 1920s as a 
counter-move against the strong cartelisation of the German economy and its 
corporatist links with a weak political system. The school survived National 
Socialism; it was perceived as one among the German traditions not 
contaminated by National Socialism and therefore entitled to broad public 
recognition and influence. The details need not concern us here. What is 
important to note, however, is our concern for the social dimension of the 
European project, the initial compatibility of Ordo-liberalism and the model 
of the social market, and the dissolution of this alliance which was replaced 
by a new alliance between the second generation of Ordo-liberalism and 
Anglo-Saxon neo-liberalism.21 
The leading protagonists of the Freiburg School, the intellectual Heimat of 
Germany’s post-war Ordo-liberalism in both economic and legal scholarship, 
namely, Walter Eucken and Franz Böhm, derived from the dual commitments 
                                                        
20 See, the references in Joerges and Rödl, “The ‘Social Market Economy’ as Europe’s Social 
Model?”, EUI Working Paper Law No. 2004/8. 
21 See Joerges (note 19), 468 et seq.; Wigger, “Competition for Competitiveness: The Politics of 
the Transformation of the EU Competition Regime”, PhD Thesis VU Amsterdam, 2008, ch. 3 (pp. 
100 et seq.) 





to the idea of an “undistorted system of competition”, on the one hand, and to 
the promise of social justice and security, on the other, a challenging task: the 
dual commitment required institutionalising specific, albeit inter-dependent, 
orders, namely, a legally-structured order of industrial relations and of social 
security (“Arbeits- und Sozialverfassung”) along with the legally guaranteed 
economic ordo, the “economic constitution” (Wirtschaftsverfassung). In this 
sense, the economic order of which the protagonists of the “social market 
economy” envisaged was meant to be “socially embedded”. 
The “really existing social market economy”, however, was never as 
coherently realised as their conceptual Vordenker would have liked to see it. 
Even its economic core institution – its Wirtschaftsverfassung – was, by no 
means, a theoretically-uncontested and legally-consolidated project. The 
strongest practical challenge to the Freiburg style of Ordnungspolitik was the 
renaissance of Germany’s corporatist traditions already in the early years of 
the Bonn Republic. The Federal Republic was characterised by permanent 
tensions between Theorie und Praxis: striking discrepancies between the 
officious rhetoric of Ordnungspolitik on the one hand, and the ongoing 
bargaining between the political system and the political and economic actors, 
on the other – a German Lebenslüge, to be sure, albeit an economically-
successful and socially-beneficial arrangement.22 The perception of this 
discrepancy will have influenced the (ordo)-liberal commitment to the 
integration project. The European level of governance promised to ensure 
stronger barriers against the renaissance of Germany’s corporatist traditions 
and its political opportunism in economic affairs than the domestic 
institutional pillars of Germany’s Ordnungspolitik. 
 
                                                        
22 Well documented by Abelshauser, Die Langen Fünfziger Jahre. Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft in 
Deutschland 1949–1966, (Schwann, 1987). 
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II.3 Europe as Community: Joseph H.H. Weiler 
In his very first publication on European issues,23 Joseph Weiler presented a 
vision, which he substantiated and defended in his PhD thesis, then retold, 
refined and complemented in his seminal narrative on the “Transformation of 
Europe”:24 Europe has in its foundational period, so Weiler argued, managed 
to establish an equilibrium between legal supranationalism and political 
intergovernmentalism. His portrayal of European integration was path-
breaking, unique in its doctrinal lucidity and its sensitivity for the European 
synthesis of “the political” and the law. 
Weiler’s oeuvre is a powerful critique of the type of national state which 
Weber’s inaugural address describes. Nowhere, however, did he talk about 
something akin to “social Europe”. Even in the concluding passages on 
democracy in Europe and the legitimacy of the integration project of the 
“Transformations of Europe”, there is no mention of the possibility that 
democracy might pre-suppose social justice and that Europe’s socially-
defined legitimacy might erode through a destruction of welfare state 
traditions. And yet, even though Weiler’s value-laden work is characterised 
by a profound distance to technocratic precepts and economic rationalisation 
of the European Community, his visions seem surprisingly compatible with 
the benign neglect of the “social deficit” of the European order in European 
legal studies during the foundational period. To be sure, Weiler’s re-
construction of the Europe as a Janus-headed polity was not meant as a 
conceptualisation which would exclude Europe’s engagement in social issues 
as a matter of (legal) principle. It is, nevertheless, true that, thanks to the 
Realpolitik-kernel of his analysis, “social Europe” was an unlikely option, and 
                                                        
23 Weiler, “The Community system: the dual character of supranationalism”, (1981) 1 Yearbook of 
European Law, 257–306. 
24 (1990–91) 100 Yale Law Journal, 2403–2485. 





one of very limited significance, anyway. It was highly unlikely simply 
because its advent was dependent on unanimous inter-governmental voting; 
it was, by the same token, of little concern as the later tensions between the 
integrationist objective and the legacy of European welfarism were still 
dormant. 
 
III. The sensitivity of legal inegration theory: three 
retractions 
The current problems of the European project are simply overwhelming. 
There is no consensus neither in the diagnosis of the causes nor on the proper 
remedies to be taken and the prospects of political developments which 
would enable Europe to reconstitute stable perspectives are uncertain. It is 
nevertheless becoming possible to identify institutional design defects of the 
integration project and the readiness to address such failures in academic 
discourses as well as in public debates is growing. It is hence unsurprising 
that legal integration theory has started to reconsider its premises and 
prospects. And it seems remarkable indeed that this rethinking has already 
started before the current crisis. This is the case in all of the three 
conceptualisation of the integration project – technocratic rule, economic 
rationality, and the community vision – that we have sketched out above. 
These models were not chosen at random. They represent evolutionary 
options among which the integration project kept oscillating. None of them 
identified with the ambitions of the constitutional convention and the 
mainstream strive for a comprehensive democratic constitutionalisation of the 
Union. All of them have nevertheless or because of that type of modesty been 
continuously present in Europe’s integration process ever since the 
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foundational period. They have of course been developing, even mutating, 
within their particular perspectives, be it in their responses to changing 
contexts, be it through mutual observation and political learning. We can 
neither try to document the continuities and innovations within each 
tradition, nor discuss the affinities between them in any detail. It is sufficient, 
for our argument, to characterise crucial transformations within each of them 
– and to underline telling parallels in their diagnosis of the current impasses. 
 
III.1 Technocracy without Efficiency: Majone’s Critical Turn  
The importance of the technocratic tradition in the praxis of the integration 
project can hardly be over-estimated. Its weight was bound to increase with 
the involvement of the European Community in ever more regulatory policies 
which were to be organised at transnational levels without the backing of a 
consolidated democratic order. How else than through an “objective” and 
expertise-based conceptualisation of its enormous tasks could the European 
Community hope to ensure the acceptance of its involvement in ever more 
problem-solving activities? The by far most interesting and influential work 
which renewed and refined the legacy is that of Giandomenico Majone.25 It is 
unique not only in its clarity and its coherence, but also in its reflections of the 
option for an alternative to the democratic constitutionalism the Member 
States of the European Union. Majone’s famous conceptualisation of Europe 
as a “regulatory State”26 which operates essentially through non-majoritarian 
institutions was conceived as ensuring the credibility of commitments to in 
                                                        
25 Who confronted European studies right upon his return to Europe with essays like “Regulating 
Europe: Problems and Prospects”, (1989) 3 Jahrbuch zur Staats- und Verwaltungswissenschaft, 
159-177; “Cross-national resources of regulatory policymaking in Europe and the United States”, 
(1991) 11 Journal of Public Policy, 79-106 and kept working on the perspectives outlined therein 
ever since (see, recently, his Europe as the Would-be word power (Cambridge UP, 2010). 
26 Majone, “The European Community as a Regulatory State”, 1994-V/1 Collected Courses of the 
Academy of European Law, (Martinus Nijhoff, 1996), 321-419 and Regulating Europe (Routledge, 
1996) 





principle uncontested policy objectives. Welfare policies pose additional 
problems. The Union’s failure to institutionalize a comprehenseive social 
policy results partly from the “reluctance of the member states to surrender 
control of a politically salient and popular area of public policy”; equally 
important is the factual difficulty and political impossibility to replace the 
variety of European welfare state models and traditions by some integrated 
European scheme.27 Not only does Majone respect the primacy of 
constitutional democracies; he is equally, and with increasing urgency, 
underlining the fallacy of an ever more perfect and comprehensive subjection 
of the integration project to its “operational code”, the principle “that 
integration has priority over all competing values” 28, and also the camouflage 
strategies which he calls “integration by stealth”.29 This is an alarming 
retraction from his earlier trust in the problem-solving potential of the 
European project. His warnings do, by no means, reflect a change of 
theoretical premises. Majone continues to underline that Europe is not 
legitimated to pursue the type of distributional politics which welfare states 
have institutionalised.30 He does not retract his plea for regulatory efficiency. 
His critical turn is, instead, motivated by the inefficiencies which he observes in 
the Union’s operations. His quest for more modesty in Europe’s ambitions 
(“Geht’s nicht eine Nummer kleiner?”)31 summarises these observations. His 
adaptation of the “unity in diversity” formula32 is an implication of these 
insights to which we will return in the following Section IV. 
                                                        
27 Majone, Europe as the Would-be World Power, (note 25), p. 144. 
28 Ibid., p. 1. 
29 See his Dilemmas of European Integration: The Ambiguities and Pitfalls of Integration by Stealth, 
(Oxford UP, 2005). 
30 Majone, Europe as the Would-be World Power, (note 25), p. 128 et seq. – And it is for that 
reason erroneous to classify Majone as a “technocrat”. His reserves against a comprehensive 
European social model rested from early on the democratic concern for a proper legitimation of 
distributional politics; see Joerges, „Der Philosoph als wahrer Rechtslehrer. Review Essay on 
Giandomenico Majone”, Regulating Europe, 5 (1999) European Law Journal, 147-153. 
31 Ibid., p. 170 et seq. 
32 Ibid., p. 205 et seq. 
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III.2 What is Left of the Economic Constitution: Ordo-liberal Concerns 
An institutionalisation of economic efficiency is widely perceived to day, 
either affirmatively or critically, as Europe’s core agenda.33 This perception 
gained prominence since the legendary White Paper on the Completion of the 
Internal Market.34 What is hardly noticed, however, even within Germany’s 
European law circles, is that the ordo-liberal tradition had in the 1970s, and 
hence long before Delors launched his Internal market Programme, 
experienced a deep transformation. That mutation had started at national 
level with the move of Friedrich von Hayek from Chicago to Freiburg and his 
promotion of his version of neo-liberalism which was situated between the 
Freiburg School’s orthodoxy, on the one hand, and the Chicago School’s 
paläo-liberalism, on the other. Von Hayek’s notion of “competition as a 
discovery process” captures the essence of his messages best. They have led 
the second generation of ordo-liberal scholars to re-define the objectives and 
the methods of national and European competition law. Attention shifted 
from the control of economic power to the protection of entrepreneurial 
freedom and the critique of anti-competitive regulation, complemented by the 
idea of regulatory competition. What happened in the 1970s has been 
analysed with an amazing precision a good number of years ago by Michel 
Foucault in the course of the lectures he delivered at the Collège de France.35 
                                                        
33 See, on the one hand, the contributions on European economic law in von Bogdandy and Bast, 
Principles of European Constitutional Law, (Hart Publishing, 2nd ed. 2011), by Haltje (“The 
Economic Constitution within the Internal Market), pp. 589-629, and Drexl (“Competition Law as 
Part of the European Constitution“), pp. 659-698, which are strongly indebted to the ordoliberal 
tradition, and Höpner and Schäfer, “A New Phase of European Integration: Organized Capitalisms 
in Post-Ricardian Europe”, (2010) 33 West European Politics, 344-368, on the other. – Such 
theoretical controversies vary of course as strongly as Europe’s varieties of capitalism. 
34 European Commission, “White Paper to the European Council on Completion of the Internal 
Market”, COM (85) 310 final, 14 June 1985. 
35 Foucault, Naissance de la biopolitique. Cours au Collège de France, (Paris: Seuil/Gallimard, 
2004), in particular the lecture of 7 February 1979, pp. 105-134, and that of 14 February 1979, 
pp. 135-164. 





There, Foucault characterised the ordo-liberal vision of the strong state which 
is committed to the protection of the competitive ordering of the market as 
new type of guovernmentalité, namely, the acceptance of market governance by 
the political system and the whole of society.36 There are remarkable affinities 
between the second generation Ordo-liberalism and the Chicago School when 
it comes to practical issues of competition law and policy, but they have never 
led to a real merger of the two schools. The heirs of Eucken and von Hayek 
did not subscribe to the Chicago understanding of economic output efficiency 
and “consumer welfare” but continued to define and defend the “system of 
undistorted competition” as the core of Europe’s “economic constitution”.37 
They witnessed, however, a steady decline of the impact of their visions, 
which became most clearly visible in the substantial broadening of European 
economic policies in the Treaty of Maastricht,38 then in the so-called 
“modernisation” of European competition law39 and the turn to the “more 
economic approach”.40 The weakening of their ideational power was 
symbolically confirmed when French Prime Minister Sarkozy saw to it that 
the Union’s commitment to “a system ensuring that competition is not 
distorted” was not included in Article 3 TFEU (ex Article 2 TEU) but moved 
back into Protocol 27 of the Treaty of Lisbon.41 Under the impression of the 
                                                        
36 “… [A]u lieu d’accepter une liberté du marché, définie par l’État et maintenue en quelque sorte 
sur surveillance étatique… eh bien, disent les ordolibéraux, il faut entièrement retourner la 
formule et se donner la liberté du marché comme principe organisateur et régulateur de 
l’État…Autrement dit, un État sous surveillance du marché plutôt qu’un marché sous surveillance 
de l’État”, Biopolitique (note 35), Lecture 5, p. 120. 
37 See E.-J. Mestmäcker, Wirtschaft und Verfassung in der Europäischen Union. Beiträge zu Recht, 
Theorie und Politik der europäischen Integration, (Nomos, 2003), with a collection of essays 
written from 1965 to 2001 and his recent critique of E. Posner in A legal theory without law 
Posner v. Hayek on Economic Analysis of Law, (Mohr Siebeck, 2007). 
38 See Streit and Mussler, “The Economic Constitution of the European Community. From ‘Rome’ 
to ‘Maastricht’”, (1995) 1 European Law Journal, 5-30. 
39 Schweitzer, “Competition Law and Public Policy: Reconsidering an Uneasy Relationship: The 
Example of Art. 81” (December 1, 2007), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1092883. 
40 See Schmidtchen, Albert and Voigt (Eds.), The More Economic Approach to European 
Competition Law, (Mohr Siebeck, 2007). 
41 Legally speaking, the removal looks insignificant, as, for example, Behrens has underlined “Der 
Wettbewerb im Vertrag von Lissabon”, (2008) 21 Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht, 
193; the law’s truth, however, is not the whole truth. 
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crisis, the ordo-liberal tradition is experiencing unprecedented challenges. 
The school had understood Economic and Monetary Union with its 
dedication to price stability and its institutional protection by the 
establishment of an independent banking authority outside the framework of 
the Treaty as the crowning of the internal market – which seemed more 
important than the status of the “system of undistorted competition”. The 
derogation of the European Central Bank from its original mandate was 
therefore bound to meet with fierce critique.42 Europe’s recent crisis 
management has not yet been scrutinised by prominent school 
representatives comprehensively. But its incompatibility with their concepts 
seems quite obvious. To be sure, the new strive for “competitiveness” and 
budgetary disciple as envisaged in particular by the new Fiscal Compact,43 
resonate with ordo- and neo-liberal precepts. What is deeply problematic, 
however, is the enforcement of these objectives. The “European Semester” 44 
and the rules of “Six Pack” 45 provide for discretionary and situational 
measures – an ordering of the European economy not “through” law but 
outside justiciable criteria.46 
 
III.3 Unity without Community: J.H.H. Weiler’s Constitutional Caution 
Joseph Weiler’s early work can in hindsight be identified as truly path 
breaking in that it synthesised, in a novel way, Europe’s constitutive historical 
move towards a common peaceful future, the construction of a supranational 
                                                        
42 See, most prominently, Mestmäcker, “Der Schamfleck ist die Geldverachtung“, Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, 18.11.2011, p.33. 
43 Treaty on Stability, Co-ordination and Governance, http://european-
council.europa.eu/media/639235/st00tscg26_en12.pdf. 
44 Communication from the Commission on 12 May 2010, COM(2010) 250 final. 
45 The five regulations 1173-1177/2011/EU and directive 2011/85/EU of 8 November 2011, OJ L 
91/2011, 1. 
46 See Adamski, “Europe’s (Misguided) Constitution of Economic Prosperity’, paper presented at 
the conference “Crise et droit économique”, Wroclaw, Poland, 8-9 November 2012. 





legal alternative to the role of law in the international system, while 
remaining aware of the political embeddedness and dependency of these 
accomplishments. The great normative perspectives and the sensitive realism 
in his design of equilibrium between “legal supranationalism” and “political 
intergovernmentalism”, however, became gradually ever more apparent as 
Weiler sought to develop his construct and vision further in the light of 
Europe’s experiences, accomplishments and failures. In his seminal article on 
the “Transformation of Europe”, he delivered an insightful diagnosis of the 
problematical implications of majority-voting in terms of Europe’s 
legitimacy.47 He was among the first to realise the normative and political 
ambivalences of the completion of the Internal Market by the Delors 
Commission: 
“[T]o regard the Community as a technological instrument is, in the first 
place, to under-estimate the profound political choice and cultural 
impact which the single market involves – a politics of efficiency, a 
culture of market.”48 
Weiler has never subscribed to the far-reaching ambitions of the convention 
process49 and he is among the most prominent warners against the quest for 
“ever more Europe” with comprehensive economic governance.50 
We can summarise the forgoing observations in an interim conclusion: the 
impasses of the integration praxis are mirrored and foreshadowed by the 
exhaustion of the main theoretical perspectives which have accompanied and 
oriented legal reflections, theoretical conceptualisations and the prescriptive 
                                                        
47 Weiler, “The Transformation of Europe”, (1990–91) 100 Yale Law Journal, 2403–2485, at 2461 
et seq. 
48 Idem, “Fin-de-Siècle Europe”, in: Dehousse (Ed.), Europe After Maastricht: An Ever Closer Union, 
(Beck, 1994), pp. 203-216, p. 215. 
49 See, e.g., his “On the power of the word: Europe’s constitutional iconography, (2005) ICON 3 
173-190. 
50 See his “The political and legal culture of European integration: An exploratory essay”, (2011) 
ICON 9, 678-694. 
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modelling of Europe’s finalité. Where practice and theory concur so 
significantly in their retroactive moves, the search for alternative paradigm 
seems overdue. 
 
IV.  Europe’s Legitimacy Problem Revisited: The Conflicts 
Law Alternative 
Europe’s “operational code” is to prioritise integration “over all other 
conceivable values including democracy”.51 “Unity in diversity”, the motto of 
the Constitutional Treaty, has become Majone’s new leitmotiv.52 Our immodest 
assertion is: The proper legal form of the Draft-Treaty’s motto is a re-
conceptualisation of European law as a new type of supranational conflicts 
law. Sine the approach has been presented elsewhere often enough,53 
commentary is here restricted to a depiction of its five core messages.54 
 
IV.1 Conflicts Law as Democratic Commandment 
The entire construction is built upon a sociological observation with 
normative implications. Under the impact of Europeanisation and 
                                                        
51 Majone, Europe as the Would-be World Power, (note 25), p. 1. 
52 Ibid., p. 205 et seq. 
53 For an earlier version, see Joerges, “Rethinking European Law's Supremacy: A Plea for a 
Supranational Conflict of Laws” (with comments by Damian Chalmers, Rainer Nickel, Florian 
Rödl, Robert Wai), EUI Working Paper Law 12/2005; for affirmative and critical comments see 
Joerges, Kjaer and Ralli (Eds.), Conflicts Law as Constitutional Form in the Postnational 
Constellation, Transnational Legal Theory, Vol. 2, Issue 2 (special issue), 2011; for a particularly 
sensitive recent discussion cf., Teubner, Constitutional Fragments: Societal Constitutionalism in 
Globalization, (Oxford UP, 2012), p. 150 et seq. 
54 In the following I draw on “Integration through Conflicts Law: On the Defence of the European 
Project by means of alternative conceptualisation of legal constitutionalisation”, in: Nickel (Ed) 
Conflict of Laws and Laws of Conflict in Europe and Beyond – Patterns of Supranational and 
Transnational Juridification, (Intersentia, 2010), pp. 377-400 and “The Idea of a Three-
dimensional Conflicts Law as Constitutional Form”, in Joerges and Petersmann (Eds.), 
Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade Governance and International Economic Law (Hart Publishing, 
2nd 2011), 413-455. 





globalisation, contemporary societies experience an ever stronger schism 
between decision-makers and those who are impacted upon by decision-
making. This schism poses a democracy problem for anybody defending the 
idea that the citizens of democratic polities should be able to interpret them as 
in the last instance as the authors of the law they are supposed to comply 
with. This is the observation on which Jürgen Neyer and the present author 
based their quest for a legitimation of European law by its potential to 
compensate structural democracy failures of nation states back in 1997.55 Even 
then the argument was not fundamentally new. Jürgen Habermas had 
submitted a very similar idea in his very first essay on European integration.56 
His most recent re-statement is close to identical with our formula: 
“Nation-states … encumber each other with the external effects of decisions 
that impinge on third parties who had no say in the decision-making 
process. Hence, states cannot escape the need for regulation and 
coordination in the expanding horizon of a world society that is 
increasingly self-programming, even at the cultural level …”57 
Our basic intuition still seems plausible. However, it must not be understood 
as a kind passé-partout which would justify all kinds of interventions into the 
political autonomy of constitutional states and their decision-making 
procedures. Any correction of undemocratic external effects must in itself be 
justified. Suffice it here to point to the control and correction of budgetary 
policies and all sectors of national polities by the regulatory machinery which 
                                                        
55 Joerges and Neyer, “From Intergovernmental Bargaining to Deliberative Political Processes: 
The Constitutionalisation of Comitology”, (1997) 3 European Law Journal, 273-299, at 293. 
Jürgen Neyer has elaborated and refined the argument systematically in his recent monograph on 
The Justification of Europe. A Political Theory of Supranational Integration (Oxford UP, 2012).  
56 Habermas, Staatsbürgerschaft und nationale Identität, (Erker, 1991), reprinted in Between 
Facts and Norms. Between Facts and Norms. Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and 
Democracy, (MIT Press, 1998), pp. 491-516, at 503: The citizens today experience “an ever 
greater gap being passively affected and actively participating”.  
57 Habermas, “Does the Constitutionalization of International Law Still Have a Chance?”, in idem, 
The Divided West (Polity Press, 2007), pp. 113–93, 176. 
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the six pack and the fiscal compact have by now established.58 This proviso is 
an integral dimension of the following deliberations and suggestions.  
 
IV.2 The Supranationality of European Conflicts Law 
Our plea for a new understanding of EU law, must not, the connotations of its 
terminological origin notwithstanding, serve as a retraction from 
supranationalism as such. Quite to the contrary, it furnishes a justification for 
the validity of the supranational jurisdiction – albeit one which is, just like the 
three models of legal integration theory discussed above,59 at the same time 
depicting the limits of supranational rule. To rephrase its sociological and 
normative basis slightly: as a consequence of their manifold degree of inter-
dependence, the Member States of the European Community/Union are no 
longer in a position to guarantee the democratic legitimacy of their policies. A 
European law that concerns itself with the amelioration of such external 
effects, i.e., which seeks to compensate for the failings of the national 
democracies, may induce its legitimacy from this compensatory function. It 
can thus operate to strengthen democracy without needing to establish itself 
as a democratic state. 
 
IV.3 Convergence, Re-construction, Critique 
Clearly, such a democratic exoneration of European law is only plausible to 
the exact degree that it may be re-constructed within this perspective, or that 
                                                        
58 See, in detail, Joerges, “The European Economic Constitution and its Transformation Through 
the Financial Crisis”, in Patterson and Södersten (Eds.), A Companion to European Union law and 
International Law, (Wiley-Blackwell, 2013, forthcoming), text accompanying notes 53 et seq.; 
Joerges and Weimer, “A crisis of executive managerialism in the EU: no alternative?, Maastricht 
Faculty of Law Working Paper 2012/7, 28 et seq. 
59 Sections II.1-3 and III.2. 





it may be furnished with a conflicts-law orientation. This, however, is already, 
often enough, the case: European law has given legal force to principles and 
rules which serve the purpose of supranational “recognition” – the non-
discrimination principle, the supranational definition and the demarcation of 
legitimate regulatory concerns, the demands for justification for actions that 
are imposed upon national legal systems, and the proportionality principle – 
which supplies a legal yardstick against which respect for supranationally-
guaranteed freedoms may be measured – and the demand that all public 
exercise of power pays due regard to fundamental rights. All these principles 
and rules may be understood as a concretisation of a supranational conflicts 
law, which guarantees that the actions of the Member States are reconcilable 
with their position within the Community. This is not to say, however, that 
the solutions to the conflicts at which European law has actually arrived, are 
always convincing. Our re-construction of European law in the normative 
perspectives just outlined will reveal tensions between “”facticity” and 
“validity”, as well as failures and missed opportunities – the conflicts 
approach shares this type of experience with the three approaches from which 
it seeks to replace. 
 
IV.4 Vertical, horizontal and diagonal Conflicts in Europe’s multi-level 
system and the Idea of a Three–dimensional Conflicts Law 
Europe’s multi-level system cannot be organised and administered 
hierarchically. The legal validity of this insight stems from the apportionment 
of competences within the EU; its factual strength stems from vast 
discrepancies in the operational resources available at each ruling level. The 
conflicts-law approach distinguishes accordingly between vertical, “diagonal” 
and horizontal collisions. Diagonal collisions are an important and unique 
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feature of multi-level systems. They are a constant feature of the Union’s 
praxis, since the competences, which are required for comprehensive 
problem-solving are often only partly available at the at the level of the EU 
itself; problem-solving then needs to resort to complementary competences of 
the Member States. This constellation gives rise to two forms of potential 
conflict – on the one hand, between divergent EU and national political 
orientations, and, on the other, between divergent interest constellations in 
the Member States – so that very particular mediation arrangements must be 
identified. This need for mediation is a characteristic feature of all multi-level 
systems, but is particularly pressing in the case of the EU, where the existence 
of diagonal conflict has had, as its corollary, the evolution of a particularly 
intense degree of administrative co-operation, the institutionalisation of 
advice-giving instances, and the systematic construction of non-governmental 
co-operative relationships. This infrastructure may be understood as 
furnishing the integral components of a conflicts law that may no longer 
restrict be realised. Such conflicts law must be methodologically and 
organisationally open to the same type of evolution, which we have 
witnessed within national systems, namely has the development of post-
interventionist regulatory practices and legal forms. Accordingly, we 
distinguish between three types of conflicts-law ordering or “three 
dimensions” of conflicts law, which operate in three dimensions: conflicts law 
of the “first order” is flanked, on the one hand, by a conflicts law, which, most 
specifically in the realm of European comitology, has concerned itself with the 
elaboration of material (substantive) regulatory options, and, on the other 
hand, by a conflicts law, which governs the supervision of para-legal law and 
self-regulatory organisation.60 
                                                        
60 This point will be taken up again in Section VI below; see also Joerges and Rödl, 
“Reconceptualising the constitution of Europe's post-national constellation – by dint of conflict of 





IV.5 Conflicts Law as Proceduralising Constitutionalism 
It follows from the preceding sections that it would be factually and 
normatively mistaken to regard European law as a system of law dedicated to 
the incremental construction of a comprehensive legal edifice. Europe must, 
learn to accept the fact that its diversity will accompany it far into the future, 
so that conflict born of diversity will continue to characterise the process of 
European integration. It should therefore further concede that this process 
should be overseen by a type of law, which, by virtue of its identification of 
the principles and rules that govern conflict, will generate the law of the 
European multi-level system. Europeanisation, then, is not simply a process 
of change; it is also a learning process. Law cannot pre-determine the 
substance of such processes, but may yet secure its own normative character, 
by virtue of its self-dedication to the processes of law-making and its 
justification (Recht-Fertigung), which mirror and defend the justice and 
fairness within law.61 This understanding is by no means simply some 
Germanic idiosyncrasy.62 It is akin to, for example, Antje Wiener’s notion of 
“the invisible constitution”63 or Deirdre Curtin’s concept of the “living 
constitution”.64 Should it be that such seemingly daring ideas are in fact 
realistic in the sense that they represent the only conceivable type of 
responses to the challenges to which the European project is constantly and 
permanently exposed? 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
laws”, in: I. Lianos and Odudu (Eds.), Regulating Trade in Services in the EU and the WTO. Trust, 
Distrust and Economic Integration (Cambridge UP, 2012), pp. 762-80. 
61 See Wiethölter, “Just-ifications of a Law of Society”, in Perez and Teubner, (Eds.), Paradoxes 
and Inconsistencies in the Law, (Hart Publishing, 2005), pp. 65-77.  
62 See Everson and Eisner, The Making of the EU Constitution: Judges and Lawyers Beyond 
Constitutive Power, (Milton Park: Routledge-Cavendish, 2007), in particular, p. 41 et seq. 
63 Wiener, The Invisible Constitution of Politics: Contested Norms and International Encounters, 
(Cambridge UP, 2008). 
64 Curtin, Executive Power of the European Union. Law, Practices and the Living Constitution, 
(Oxford UP, 2009). 
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V. Examplary illustrations: Market building and the recent 
Labour Law Jurisprudence of the CJEU 
As indicated, the conflicts-law approach is not meant as an artificial 
juxtaposition to positive European law, but it does claim to take up the legacy 
of legal realism, and, hence, to articulate that law’s “real life”, to help us to see 
what the law “does”. This is a reconstructive but by no means a purely 
affirmative exercise. To submit that European law “is” conflicts law is to 
underline and illuminate its function and its problematic – the legal responses 
to the conflicts can be convincing, less fortunate or even deplorable.  
 
V.1 The Example of Cassis de Dijon 
The conflicts-law approach advocates mitigation between controversies over 
diverging policies and complex interest configuration. With this aspiration, 
the approach departs markedly from the traditional treatment of public law 
provisions in private international law, international public and 
administrative law. Europe has, as Jona Israël put it, the chance and vocation 
to transform the comitas (voluntary and diplomatic co-ordination) among its 
states and societies into a legally-binding commitment to co-operative 
problem-solving.65 This has been accomplished in countless cases -- often 
convincingly. The Court’s legendary Cassis de Dijon judgment of 197966 may 
serve to illustrate this point. The Court’s response to the controversy between 
Germany and France over Germany’s prescriptions on a minimum percentage 
of alcohol in liquor was as plausible as it was trifling: the confusion of 
German consumers could be avoided, and a reasonable degree of protection 
                                                        
65 Israël, European Cross-Border Insolvency Regulation, (Intersentia, 2005), pp 123, 150-152, and 
323-334. 
66 Case 120/78, ECR [1979] 649. 





against erroneous decisions by German consumers could be achieved by 
simply disclosing the lower alcohol content of the competing French liqueur. 
At closer inspection, the court’s answer to the conflict constellation in Cassis is 
not as plausible as it appears at first sight. As Damian Chalmers, in a critique 
of this author’s praise of Cassis,67 has underlined, at stake in this constellation 
which did not only affect only the two directly involved parties, the 
marketing strategies of a powerful distribution chains like REWE were a 
threat to the survival of small shops which were not in a position to provide 
consumers. Through the upgrading of economic freedoms to constitutional 
rights, the CJEU has indeed assumed en passant constitutional functions. 68 The 
issue, then, is of whether the Court has gone a step too far when 
complementing the recognition of the constitutional status of economic 
freedoms by its authoritative definition of the kind of concerns which are 
deemed to be compatible with the establishment of a common European 
market.69 All this however, does in no way affect the reading of Cassis as a 
conflicts law case. The CJEU handed down a ruling on a complex conflict 
constellation. This ruling does provide a legal framework for this conflict. The 
Court failed to evaluate all dimensions of this conflict when pursuing its 
market building agenda. This judgment “is” nonetheless conflicts law, albeit 
not necessarily good law. 
 
                                                        
67 “Deliberative Supranationalism and the Reterritorialization of Authority”, in: Kohler-Koch and 
Rittberger (Eds.), Debating the Democratic Legitimacy, (Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), pp. 329-
343, at 334. 
68 See, a good while ago, Steindorff, “Probleme des Art. 30 EWG”, (1984) 148 Zeitschrift für das 
gesamte Handelsrecht und Wirtschaftsrecht, 338-355. 
69 See, in a similar vein, Menéndez, “United they diverge? From conflicts to constitutional theory? 
Critical remarks on Joerges’ theory of conflicts of law”, RECON WP 2011/6, Oslo 2011. 
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V.2 A Neo-liberal Market Community? The Recent Labour Law 
Jurisprudence of the CJEU 
It is difficult for anybody aware of continental private and public 
international law or Anglo-Saxon conflict of laws not to realise the 
discrepancies between the latter disciplines and the much-debated recent 
labour law jurisprudence of the ECJ provides a line of cases in point. The 
much-debated recent labour law jurisprudence of the ECJ provides a line of 
cases in point. What deserves closer scrutiny, however, is the contents of the 
principles and rules which the ECJ has invoked and developed in its 
responses to the conflict constellations which were referred to it. 
 
V.2.1 Viking, Laval, Rüffert 
These three cases are, by now, so well-known that it should suffice here to 
summarise their contents very briefly. 
The first case was decided on 11 December 2007.70 Finnish seafarers, 
employed on the ferry Rosella, become aware of the intention of their 
employer to flag out to Estonia. Since they were afraid of losing their jobs or 
being forced to accept lower wages, they tried to impress their employer by 
threatening to strike. This was legal under Finnish law. But, so their Finnish 
employer argued, such action was incompatible with its right Viking’s right of 
free establishment as enshrined in Article 43 EC. 
The response of the ECJ is conciliatory in its tone, but is, in fact, quite rigid. 
The ECJ starts out with underlining that the “right to take collective action, 
including the right to strike … [is] a fundamental right which forms an 
                                                        
70 Case C-438/05, International Transport Workers’ Federation, Finnish Seamen’s Union v. Viking 
Line ABP, OÜ Viking Line Eesti, [2007] ECR I-10779. 





integral part of the general principles of Community law”.71 Then, however, 
the Court fundamentally re-configures the traditional balance between 
economic freedoms at European level and social rights at national level, 
explaining that the Member States, although “still free, in principle, to lay 
down the conditions governing the existence and exercise of the rights in 
question…must nevertheless comply with Community law […]. 
Consequently, the fact that Article 137 EC does not apply to the right to strike 
or to the right to impose lock-outs is not such as to exclude collective action 
such as that at issue in the main proceedings from the application of Article 43 
EC”. 
The second case was decided only one week later.72 Laval, a company 
incorporated under Latvian law, had won the tender for a school building on 
the outskirts of Stockholm. In obtaining the tender, it had profited from the 
differences in the wage levels of Latvia and Sweden. In May 2004, when work 
was to start, and after Laval had posted several dozens of its workers, the 
Swedish trade unions resorted to hostile actions against Laval with such 
determination and intensity that Laval gave up. 
The Unions had acted legally according to Swedish law, but the Court 
referred to Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the 
framework of the provision of services.73 
This Directive requires, with respect to a number of essential working 
conditions, that foreign workers are not to be disadvantaged. According to 
Article 3, workers are to be guaranteed the minimum rates of pay. According 
to the general principle of the same Article, the rates of pay must be laid 
down either “by law, regulation or administrative provision” or “by collective 
                                                        
71 Case C-438/05 (Viking), para. 44. 
72 Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska 
Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, avd. 1, Svenska Elektrikerförbundet, [2007] ECR I-11767. 
73 Directive 96/71/EC OJ 1996, L18/1. 
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agreements which have been declared universally applicable within the 
meaning of paragraph 8”. Sweden, however, had refrained from changing its 
pertinent laws but relied on the exceptions listed in Article 3 Paragraph 8 
(providing therein the absence of a system for declaring collective agreements 
or arbitration awards universally applicable. It left the determination of wage 
levels to collective agreements concluded among the undertakings 
themselves. The Court argued that, in this respect, Sweden was in breach of 
(secondary) Community law.74 
In the third judgment, which was handed down on April 2008, the ECJ further 
entrenched its position.75 Rüffert concerned the legality of a tender proffered 
by one of the German Länder, Lower Saxony, which contained a clause 
indicating that the public authorities were bound to respect existing 
collective-bargaining agreements, so that tendering firms would also be 
required to abide by the relevant collective-bargaining agreements. The ECJ 
held that Lower Saxony’s legislation was irreconcilable with Article 49 EC 
since it prevented foreign service-providers from benefiting from lower wage 
costs within their country of origin. 
The vital point within the judgment is its evaluation of the protective purpose 
of the clause committing the public authorities to respect collective 
agreements: in this respect, the Court held that “contrary to the contentions of 
Land Niedersachsen and a number of the Governments, such a measure 
cannot be considered to be justified by the objective of ensuring the protection 
of workers”. 
                                                        
74 See para.s 70-71 of the judgment. 
75 Case C-346/06, Rüffert v. Land Niedersachsen, [2008] ECR I-01989. 





This finding is all the more remarkable in view of a prior pertinent decision of 
Germany’s Constitutional Court, which had explained only in 2006: 76 
“The combating of unemployment, together with measures that secure 
the financial stability of the social security system, are particularly 
important goals, for the realisation of which the legislator must be given 
a relatively large degree of decisional discretion, and especially so under 
current, politically very difficult, labour market conditions.” 77 
 
V.2.2 Dissenting Opinions in Luxembourg and their Disregard 
In all of the three cases, the Court’s Advocate Generals – Poiares Maduro in 
Viking, Mengozzi in Laval, Bot in Rüffert – had submitted Opinions which 
differed, more or less significantly, from the Court’s later judgments. In two 
more recent cases, the signals of dissent were becoming stronger and more 
articulate. 
The first case concerns the applicability of Directive 2004/18 on a German 
pension scheme for public employees, and has considerable affinities with 
Rüffert.78 The German scheme foresaw the involvement of Trade Unions in the 
transformation of parts of their remuneration into pensions 
(“Entgeltumwandlung”). The European Commission found the involvement of 
the trade unions in the selection of insurers to be compatible with the 
Directive. 
The opinion which AG Verica Trstenjak delivered on 14 April 2010 does not 
directly question the Court’s labour law jurisprudence.79 She explicitly 
                                                        
76 Bundesverfassungsgericht, - 1 BvL 4/00 - (First senate, 16 July 2006), available at the Court’s 
website at: http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/ls20060711_1bvl000400.html. 
77 Para. 103 (translation by the author; references to earlier judgments omitted). 
78 Case C-271/08, European Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany. 
79 See, in particular, para.s.196 et seq., on the Rüffert case. 
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refrains from supporting Germany’s quest for an “Albany exclusion”,80 and 
confirms the applicability of the economic freedoms. She then adds, however, 
that the social right to collective bargaining and the freedoms are of equal 
weight and invokes the principle of proportionality as a guide for its 
resolution.81 The conflict is to be resolved at the level of primary law and that 
resolution has then to guide the interpretation of secondary legislation. This 
leads her to question the validity of the Commission’s reading of the said 
Directive and to suggest that the complaint be dismissed.82 
The second case concerns the compatibility of Belgian requirements relating 
to the posting of workers in Belgium with the Posted Workers Directive.83 It 
is, in this respect, closer to Laval. GA Cruz Villalón, in his opinion of 5 May 
2010, characterises this directive as a response to the conflicts between social 
values and economic freedoms which the internal market is bound to 
generate,84 and then complements the argument of his Slovenian colleague by 
a reference to Articles 9 and 3 TFEU, suggesting that, under Treaty of Lisbon, 
social protection is no longer to be understood as an exception from the 
economic freedoms, but as commitment of general validity. Like his 
colleague, he then invokes the proportionality principle to resolve these 
tensions.85 
The two Opinions move the conflict between economic freedoms and social 
rights to the European level and thereby strengthen Europe’s judicial 
supranationalism. The premises and implications of this projection are 
difficult to understand. Both cases concern policy fields in which national law 
has not been replaced, but is only partially affected by European prerogatives. 
                                                        
80 See her discussion of Case C-67/96, [1999] ECR I-5751 in para.s 54 et seq. 
81 See para.s 186 et seq. 
82 See para. 237. 
83 Case C-515/08, Vítor Manuel dos Santos Palhota and Others. The judgment of the ECJ case dates 
from 7 October 2010. 
84 Para. 38. 
85 Para. 52 et seq.. 





The prospects for a clarification of such queries, however, do not seem bright. 
In its judgement of 15 July 2010 the ECJ (Grand Chamber) rather flatly 
rephrases what has been stated in Viking and Laval: 
“[W]hile it is true that the right to bargain collectively enjoys in Germany 
the constitutional protection conferred, generally, by Article 9(3) of the 
German Basic Law upon the right to form associations to safeguard and 
promote working and economic conditions, the fact remains that, as 
provided in Article 28 of the Charter, that right must be exercised in 
accordance with European Union law. 
Exercise of the fundamental right to bargain collectively must therefore 
be reconciled with the requirements stemming from the freedoms 
protected by the FEU Treaty, which in the present instance Directives 
92/50 and 2004/18 are intended to implement, and be in accordance 
with the principle of proportionality.”86 
 
V.3 The Conflicts Law Alternative 
What is wrong about all this? There is no space here to comment on the 
European wide discussion of this jurisprudence. The following remarks will 
be restricted to some aspects which illuminate the specifics of the conflicts law 
approach. 
 
                                                        
86 Case C-271/08, para.s 43-44. – In Case C-515/08 (note 83), the CJEU has handed down its 
judgment of the ECJ on 7 October 2010, confirming therein that “overriding reasons relating to 
the public interest capable of justifying a restriction on the freedom to provide services include 
the protection of workers” and “recognised that the Member States have the power to verify 
compliance with the national and European Union provisions” (para.s 47-48) without mentioning 
the TFEU and the Charter. In their proportionality analysis of the Belgian legislation the AG and 
the ECJ concurred. 
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V.3.1 Sweden’s Social Democratic Sonderweg 
The Laval case is about the conflict between service providers and worker 
from Eastern Europe and the protection of Workers provided by Western 
democracies. The case has a broader significance. It illustrates It is illustrative 
aspects of a “Swedish Sonderweg”: the legal status and social function of 
kollektivavtalssystemet which the Swedish legislature did not want to (dare to?) 
touch when implementing the Posted Workers Directive.87 By now the 
“Swedish model” is politically contested, and not only under pressure exerted 
by some “kleptomaniac competence extension” of the ECJ. In a conflicts law 
language, Sweden has to become aware of the tensions between its Sonderweg 
and its European commitments. The Union and its highest Court must defend 
these commitments which are, at the same time, Community entitlements – 
and also be aware of the instrumentalisation of European law and court 
proceedings in internal Swedish power battles88 – the Laval case was, after all, 
initiated and financed in Sweden.89 This is an instructive explanation of the 
background and the implication of Laval. It is also, at the same time, an 
instructive illustration of the conflict patterns which the Europeanisation 
process generates. This observation confirms the assertion that European law 
“is” conflicts law. But is Laval “good conflicts law”? The constellation is 
structurally not so different from Cassis de Dijon,90 but much more dramatic. 
The message of the conflicts-law approach is seemingly abstract: the law 
should civilise the contest over divergent policies and interests without 
assuming the mandate to streamline Europe’s diversity. 
                                                        
87 Mindus, “Theorizing Conflicts and Politicisation in the EU”, ms. Turin 2009 (on file with the 
author). 
88 Mindus, text accompanying note 35 et seq. 
89 Battle is going on in Swedish politics, legislation and jurisprudence. In a judgment of Judgment 
of 2 Dec. 2009 of the Swedish Arbetsdomstolen which imposed “exemplary damages” on the trade 
unions, which had taken action against Laval. See the annotation by Reich, “Laval ‘Vierter Akt’”, 
(2010) 21 Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht, 21-22. 
90 See Section V.1 supra. 





V.3.2 Conflicts Law’s Prudence 
“Judicial restraint” v. “judicial activism” is a misleading dichotomy here, and 
does not at all exhaust the potential of the traditions on which the conflicts-
law approach builds. 
Antoine Lyon-Caen has, without resorting to conflict of law or private 
international law terminology recalled one core message: 
“Dans les sociétés d’Europe de l’Ouest, le droit du travail s’est constitué 
par émancipation du droit du marché, dénommé moyennant les 
variations terminologiques qu’il importe de ne pas oublier: liberté du 
commerce ici, freedom of trade ailleurs… Ce n’est pas que des règles sur 
le travail n’existaient pas avant cette émancipation, mais elles relevaient 
d’avantage d’une police du travail, partie plus ou moins autonome d’une 
police du ou des marchés.”91 
There is a categorical difference between economic law and labour law, Lyon-
Caen argues. This is precisely the message of the disciplinary tradition the 
conflicts-law approach seeks to recall. The most basic notion of this discipline 
“characterisation”,92 Ernst Rabel explained in his seminal essay. And he 
added that the operation called “characterisation” has to take the views of the 
forum and the concerned jurisdictions seriously. At stake here is he 
discrepancy between economic freedoms and collective labour law. Their 
                                                        
91 “In West European Societies Labour Law was constituted as an alternative to the law of the 
market. It developed terminological distinctions which one must not disregard liberté de 
commerce here, freedom of trade there –. To be sure, legislation relating to work had been in 
place prior to that emancipatory move, but pertinent rules were meant to control work in a way 
which was more or less akin to laws policing the market or markets in general” (translation by 
the author) – thus Lyon-Caen, “Droit communautaire du marché v.s. Europe sociale.” 
Contribution to the Symposium on “The Impact of the Case Law of the ECJ upon the Labour Law of 
the Member States”, Berlin, 26 June 2008, organised by the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social 
Affairs, available at  
http://www.bmas.de/portal/27028/2008__07__16__symposium__eugh__lyon-caen.html. 
92 Rabel, “Das Problem der Qualifikation”, (1931) 5 Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und 
internationales Privatrecht, 241-288. 
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categorical difference is not written in stone but deeply rooted, albeit in a 
variety of forms, in the history of industrial and democratised societies.93 
The European law parallel is the principle of enumerated competences. 
Awareness of this parallel is no longer widespread among European law 
scholars. This is unfortunate because the sensitivity of the elder discipline for 
the specifics of legal fields although provides some guidance in the 
interpretation of such opaque provisions as Article 137 (5) EC (now 153 (5) 
TFEU).94 
The prudence suggested by conflicts law should not be read as a “solution” to 
the conflict constellation the CJEU was confronted with. What conflicts law 
suggests, however, is not to use European law as an Ersatz and compensation 
of Europe’s political failures.95 As long as political processes do not deliver 
orientation, the law should respect the variety in Europe’s social models and 
content itself with their co-ordination. It seems perfectly justified to further 
the efforts of the new Member States to exploit their competitive advantages. 
It is by no means plausible, however, that “direct wage competition” between 
workers from socio-economically very different jurisdictions would signal 
and achieve solidarity and further both the prosperity within, and 
distributional justice among, Europe’s diverse regions. It may well be that, 
through the opening of the Western Markets for cheap labour, we foreclose 
the chances for accession states to build up their own social models. Should 
we really assume that the Swedish employer organisations seek to give a 
hand to the development of Estonia by the kind of strategies they pursued 
with Laval and the financing of the lengthy litigation in that case? European 
                                                        
93 Dukes, “Hugo Sinzheimer and the Constitutional Function of Labour Law“, in Davidov and 
Langilde (Eds.), The Idea of labour Law, (Oxford UP, 2011), pp 57-68. 
94 See von Bogdandy and Bast, “The Federal Order of Competences”, in idem, Principles (note 33), 
pp 275-307, at 294, note 144.  
95 See, for a systematic elaboration, Everson and Joerges, Reconfiguring the Politics–Law 
Relationship in the Integration Project through Conflicts–Law Constitutionalism. (2012) 
European Law Journal 18 , 644–666.  





law should know more about the social price to be paid for the bringing of 
cheap labour to Old Europe before engaging in the flattening of Europe’s 
diversity. 
Again, “judicial restraint” v. “judicial activism” is not the proper frame for 
these queries. The type of prudence which the conflicts law approach requires 
is as at least as demanding, but not identical with, what we expect from the 
constitutional courts of consolidated nation states or federations in their 
supervision of legislation. To this issue, we will have to return. 
 
VI.  The “Geology” of Contemporary Law, the Project of a 
Three-dimensional Conflict s Law with a Univrtrsalist 
Imprint and a Concluding remark 
“Unitas in pluralitate”, the motto of the Constitutional Treaty, transposes the 
European ambitions and perspectives of the conflicts-law approach. Neither 
the significance of this motto, nor its translation into the language and 
proceduralising methodology of the conflicts-law approach are confined to 
Europe’s postnational constellation. The need to cope with conflicting policies 
and to ensure the legitimacy of their “weight” and co-ordination is present at 
all levels of governance, in the international system as well as within 
constitutional democracies. At all levels, this problématique has provoked a 
turn to “proceduralisation”, and fostered the insight that legal decision-
making cannot be deductive, but must be constructive and must derive its 
legitimacy from the quality of the procedures guiding its decision-making 
processes. The identification of this problématique at all levels of governance 
and in the “diagonal conflicts constellations” between them, which multi-
level constellations generate, is just one message of the conflicts-law 
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approach, which these concluding remarks wish to underline. Equally 
important is a second message which requires a three-dimensional 
differentiation of the conflicts-law approach. The title of this section alludes to 
this second message. “Geology” is a term borrowed from Joseph Weiler, who 
introduced it to explain transformations of international law of paradigmatic 
importance.96 “International law as Regulation” is a notion which he contrasts 
with “international law as Transaction” and “international law as 
Community”. It represents “a new mode of international law, specific in its 
normativity and legitimacy”. This latter insight corresponds to the grand 
debates on the new functions and normative qualities of the law of post-laissez 
faire welfare states, which dominated the agenda of the pre- and post-1968 
generations. 
 
VI.1. Post-interventionist Law and the Turn to Regulation and Governance 
These two generations witnessed, or participated in, two big waves of 
theorising. The first wave was preoccupied with the social deficits and 
methodological flaws of “legal formalism”; the replacement of formalism by 
substantive rationality criteria was the slogan of the day.97 “Law as 
regulation” was not the then prevailing terminology; substantive rationality 
was to be carried into law through “interventionism”. As all this did not 
really work out, a second wave of theorising was initiated: substantive 
rationality was replaced by post-interventionist programming, in particular 
                                                        
96 Weiler, “The Geology of International Law – Governance, Democracy and Legitimacy”, (2004) 
64 Heidelberg Journal of International Law (ZaöRV), 547-562, at 552. 
97 See Joerges, “Politische Rechtstheorie and Critical Legal Studies: Points of Contacts and 
Divergencies”, in: idem and Trubek (Eds), Critical Legal Thought: An American-German Debate 
(Nomos, 1989), pp. 597-643 at 611 et seq., reprinted in (2011) 12 German Law Journal, 554-598. 





through reflexive law and the quest for a proceduralisation of the category of 
law.98 
These moves sought to come to grips with the law’s assumption of, and 
involvement in, ever new tasks and problem-solving activities. The search for 
post-interventionist programming (“governance structures” is the now 
widely-used term) and legal methodologies sought – or should have sought - 
to reconcile the erosion of formerly “conditional” legal programmes with the 
legacy of the rule of law and the idea of law-mediated legitimacy of 
democratic rule. Nobody has characterised this new challenge as pointedly as 
Rudolf Wiethölter in one of his early essays: “Purposive programming” is the 
living law and legal conditio sine qua non (Lebenselexier) of modern 
democracies, he wrote back in 197399 and complemented this message in 1977 
through the discovery of the affinities or structural analogies with conflict of 
laws.100 In the meantime, he had already proclaimed the need for a 
“proceduralisation of the category of law”.101 
Practice, sociological research and theoretical reflections did not come to a 
standstill. We have, for many years now, accustomed ourselves to ever more 
sophisticated regulatory programming and we have, more recently, 
witnessed a turn to “governance”, a notion encompassing a grand variety of 
widely-used co-operative arrangements between governmental and non-
governmental actors. There is no space and no need to elaborate on all this 
here. The only observation to be underlined concerns the structural parallels 
                                                        
98 See also Brüggemeier and Joerges, “Workshop zu Konzepten des postinterventionistischen 
Rechts”, Zentrum für Europäische Rechtspolitik, Materialien 4, Bremen 1984. 
99 See his “Rechtswissenschaft in Kritik und als Kritik”, (Mainz: Universitätsschriften, 1973). 
100 Wiethölter, “Begriffs- oder Interessenjurisprudenz – Falsche Fronten im IPR und 
Wirtschaftsverfassungsrecht: Bemerkungen zur selbstgerechten Kollisionsnorm”, in: A. Lüderitz 
et al. (eds) Festschrift für Gerhard Kegel, (Metzner, 1977), pp. 213-263. Teubner, “Dealing with 
Paradoxes of Law: Derrida, Luhmann, Wiethölter”, in Perez and Teubner (Eds), Paradoxes and 
Inconsistencies (note 61), pp. 41-64; partisan positions are cited there in note 5. 
101 “Materialization and Proceduralization in Modern Law”, in Teubner (Ed.), Dilemmas of Law in 
the Welfare State, (Walter de Gruyter, 1986), pp. 221-249. 
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in the national and the postnational constellations. The geology which Joseph 
Weiler has depicted in international law can be observed at all levels, even 
within constitutional law. Parallel structures generate similar challenges. 
Regulatory politics need to be institutionalised and governance arrangements 
established within the European Union and beyond its “borders”. The 
practical and challenges and normative problem that these developments 
pose, however, vary considerably. 
 
VI.2. The Need for a Three-dimensional Conflicts Law 
Throughout the preceding sections, we have dealt with primary and 
secondary European law, on the one hand, and the legal systems of the 
Member States, on the other. The sociological background analytics, the 
normative premises of the doctrinal fabric of the conflicts approach can, quite 
plausibly, claim to capture the distinctiveness of the EU multi-level system 
and its vertical, horizontal and diagonal conflicts adequately. With regard to 
the latter, it should have become particularly apparent why the conflicts-law 
approach cannot be reduced to the choice of a particular legal order. 
However, European conflicts law is also distinct in the conceptualisation of 
“vertical” and “horizontal” conflicts. Its rules and principles are 
supranationally valid, and, in this respect, stronger than the legal regimes 
established by international law; equally unique is the degree to which 
European law has transformed the comitas among Member States into binding 
legal-commitments.102 This conflicts-law system, however, is by no means 
comprehensive. The structural reasons have just been addressed: the 
                                                        
102 For a comparison with WTO law, see Howse and Nicolaïdis, “Democracy without Sovereignty: 
The Global Vocation of Political Ethics”, in Broude and Shany (Eds.), The Shifting Allocation of 
Authority in International Law. Considering Sovereignty, Supremacy and Subsidiarity, (Hart 
Publishing, 2008), 163-191. 





transformations which have occurred at national level in the turn to 
regulation and governance are also under way in the EU and in the 
international system. 
Regulatory politics in the European Union have led to the establishment of 
complex transnational non-legislative quasi-administrative regimes, which 
we have characterised as a second dimension of conflicts law. It responds to the 
irrefutable need to accompany the Europeanisation of the economy by 
transnational regulatory politics which must operate outside the 
administrative-law frameworks which nation states have at their disposal. 
These need have triggered the co-operation of national bureaucracies with 
networks of epistemic communities with the European Commission in the 
much criticised – but also much praised –comitology system, the 
establishment of ever more European agencies most of whom are without 
genuine decision-making powers. The conflicts-law approach seeks, here too, 
to defend the idea of the rule of law and law-mediated legitimacy. Its 
constitutional hopes and perspectives focus on the quality of transnational 
decisions-making and its anchoring in, and supervision by, democratically 
legitimated actors – hence, again, on a proceduralisation of law.103 
The third dimension of conflicts law reacts to the “privatisation” of regulative 
tasks and the development of new “governance arrangements”, which can 
also be observed at national level, but which are, unsurprisingly, particularly 
important at transnational levels.104 Any sharp differentiation between 
primarily administratively-anchored regulative forms with which the 
conflicts law of the second dimension is concerned from the primarily private 
regimes is not possible, because of the participation of expert communities 
                                                        
103 See for a systematic elaboration Weimer, “Democratic Legitimacy through European Conflicts-
Law? The case of EU administrative governance of GMOs”, (PhD thesis EUI Florence, 2012).  
104 See Dilling, Herberg and Winter, Responsible Business. Self-Governance and Law in 
Transnational Economic Transactions, (Hart Publishing, 2008). 
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and societal actors in both of them. What the law needs to be concerned 
about, is the regulative function which both types exercise, and what it has to 
consider is its potential to ensure their legitimacy. The conflicts law approach 
in its third dimension does therefore not qualify these regimes without 
further ado as transnational “law”. Instead, it seeks to develop and promote 
the impact of normative yardsticks for their recognition by democratic legal 
orders; it furthermore builds upon the law’s shadow, particularly the interests 
of non-statal orders in external recognition and their ensuing readiness to 
subject themselves to a stringent procedural discipline.105 
 
VI.3 Concluding Remark 
The re-conceptualisation of European law as a new type of conflicts law was 
designed as an exercise in critical theory with normative perspectives which 
could, in many ways, build upon the evolutionary steps in the integration 
process, on institutional innovations, on the ingenuity of so many committed 
actors, and their readiness and potential to cope with Europe’s complex 
conflict constellations. The preceding sections even suggest that this approach 
can be usefully applied beyond the confines of the European Union, that it 
has so-to-speak a universal imprint.106 When contrasted with the state of the 
international system and globalisation process the European project could 
thanks to its many accomplishments be understood as model which the rest 
of the world should seek to follow.107 Under the impact of the present crisis 
                                                        
105 Thus is the conclusion of the extensive inquiries of Schepel, The Constitution of Private 
Governance: Product Standards in the Regulation of Integrating Markets, (Hart Publishing, 2005), 
p. 223. 
106 See Joerges, Conflicts-law constitutionalism:ambitions and problems, in Hilpold, Lavranos, 
Schneider, Ziegler (Eds.), Liber Amicorum Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, (forhcoming with Brill, 2013) 
and earlier Rödl, “Democratic Juridification Without Statisation: Law of Conflict of Laws Instead 
of a World State”, in Joerges, Kjaer and Ralli (Eds), note 53 above, 193-214. 
107 The most prominent advocate of that vision is certainly Jürgen Habermas who continues to 
defend it even where he characterises Europe as a “faltering project”, see his “Does the 





this type of European self-confidence seems no longer warranted without 
further ado. To be sure, Europe’s crisis management builds in many ways on 
its established institutions and signals an unprecedented density of political 
interaction and economic interdependence. By the same token, however, 
Europe’s resort to a new “Ersatzunionsrecht”,108 the austerity measures which 
are imposed in particular on the southern periphery and the still very 
questionable prospects of all these endeavours are anything but attractive 
models for the rest of the world.  
How do all these observations affect the conflicts-law project? They certainly 
confirm its sociological realism. Europe is exposed to evermore complex and 
precarious conflict constellations rather than developing into an ever more 
successful and harmonious union. There is also no reason to denounce its 
main normative messages, the dedication to ‘unity in diversity’, the rejection 
of the orthodox ‘one-size-fits-all’ philosophy, and the quest for a re-
configuration of the politics-law relationship which creates new space for 
political processes. What has become questionable, however, is the claim of 
conflicts-law-constitutionalism to represent a reconstructive exercise and not 
merely critical project. In the present state of the Union, the critical function 
prevails – not for too long, hopefully.  
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